Editor’s Note: Dugin wrote this soon after Trump was overthrown by the forces of Liberalism 2.0. I can’t think of a better analysis of the contrasting liberal forces that make up Trumpism and the globalists who defeated him. Dugin is the only dissident who has formulated a coherent ideological program against Liberalism.
The New Turn of Liberalism
In the present historical momentum, we can clearly distinguish a very important phenomenon: a new turn in liberal ideology. Like any other political ideology, liberalism is constantly changing, but at certain times we can catch really paradigmatic shifts which give us the right to say: here something is ending and something new is beginning. This is next-momentum. It is often accompanied by the fall of a certain political regime or the balance of power after a serious – e.g. world – war, and so on. But sometimes it passes unperceived on the latent subliminal level. Surely, we can always distinguish some symptoms of the produced changes, but their depth and the question of having reached the point of no return remain for the time being under discussion.
I argue that right now we are witnesses to such a dramatic change within liberal political ideology.
Let us call it the passage from liberalism 1.0 to liberalism 2.0. As with any serious passage, it demands a certain “rite de passage”. I interpret such to be the situation in which Donald Trump’s presidency culminated in his overthrow by the globalist elite epitomized by Joe Biden and his – once again! – Neo-con administration. But that is nothing but a “rite de passage” – manifested in gay pride parades, BLM insurgencies, LGBT+ imperial attacks, the global riot of wild feminism, and the spectacular advent of post-humanism and extreme technocracy. Behind all of this there are deeper – purely intellectual, philosophical — processes which I propose to examine.
I would like to profess in advance that I will carry out this examination through my structural approach, grounded in the Fourth Political Theory. This means that I consider liberal ideology (or the First Political Theory) to be the sum of the historical dispensation of the very paradigm of Western Modernity, which over the course of the 20th century won its epic battle against its main rivals – the communists (Second Political Theory) and fascists (Third Political Theory), who for the time being challenged the liberal pretension to be the most modern and declared themselves to be more modern than liberals. This was explicitly formulated by Marxist futurism, but also underlay the fascist way of thinking as well.
So, according to this vision, liberalism as an ideology – political, economic, cultural, social, and so on – won in the 20th century not only tactically, but strategically, and somehow irreversibly became the unique political ideology after the 1990s. This is commonly called the “unipolar moment” (Charles Krauthammer) and was – prematurely as it seems now – christened “the end of history” by Francis Fukuyama. Beyond all the details and questions of correctly measuring the timing, the ideological victory of liberalism precisely in that period was irrefutable. Chinese communism is not a full-scale alternative to liberal capitalism, because since Deng Xiaoping’s rule China has become partly embedded in the global political economy in an attempt to use such to the advantage of the country’s strength while nevertheless accepting the main liberal rules and free market principles.
That was the turning point which symbolically separated the old liberalism from the new liberalism, liberalism 1.0 from coming liberalism 2.0. Then, in the 1990s, we could register the gestation of a deep semantic mutation of the First Political Theory. Liberalism’s epic victory in the 20th century created two important ideological shifts:
- The advent of red-brown or “National-Bolshevist” alliances, based on a deep understanding of the irremediable loss of both historical communism and fascism to liberalism and on the will to create a common anti-liberal right-left front (but such remained a politically marginal tendency, incomparably small compared to the seriousness of the danger to liberal domination posed by such an ideological project).
- The solitude of liberalism, which lost both of its main ideological enemies, that constituted (as Carl Schmitt teaches in emphasizing the importance of the friend/enemy distinction for the very definition of political and ideological identity) an important element of liberalism’s self-affirmation.
Insofar as illiberal National-Bolshevism did not pose a real political threat, the problem of solitude remained essential.
National-Bolshevism as a Concept Prompted by the Victory of Liberalism
Philosophically, National-Bolshevism coincided with the parallel shift of paradigm that arrived with Post-Modernity. Post-Modern authors, coming mainly from the far left, became very critical of Soviet and partly Chinese style communism, and thus adopted the strategy of an ideological alliance – always more and more “anti-fascist” and as well anti-NB – with left liberals. So, Post-Modernism was established as a kind of common ground for ex-communists to become more and more liberal (individualist, hedonists and so on) and for left liberals to adopt the avant-guard epistemology of radical thinkers promoting extreme theories and practices of liberation – from rules, norms, stable identities, hierarchies, borders and so on. Here is where liberalism 2.0 has its roots. But in order to become explicit in the form of the new version of liberal political ideology, this took 30 more years of dramatic political life. The Trump phenomenon was the last and most decisive period that prompted the whole structure of liberalism 2.0 to appear as it is.
The main feature of liberalism 2.0 is its recognition of an inner enemy, a fifth column within liberalism as such. In the absence of well-presented ideological enemies – communists and fascists – lonely liberals were obliged to reconsider the very mapping of their dominance that had become worldwide. Ideologically, the weak red-brown tendency appeared to be more important than could be judged by its appearance as a movement with insignificant impact.
But if we consider this National-Bolshevism in broader terms, the overall picture changes drastically. The re-emergence of Putin’s Russia can be evaluated as a new mixture of the Soviet-style strategy of anti-Western politics and traditional Russian nationalism. Otherwise, Putin’s phenomenon remains enigmatic. He was approximatively equated with “National-Bolshevism”, which corroborated the main ideological frame of the unipolar – liberal – era. The same approximation could be used to interpret the Chinese phenomenon. Otherwise, it would be hard or quite simply impossible to explain the politics of China and above all the line of Xi Jinping. Here, again, we see special Chinese communism mixed with increasingly observable Chinese nationalism. The same can be said of the growth of European populism, where the distance between the left-wing and right-wing was drastically diminishing up to the point of the symbolic creation of the yellow-green alliance in the Italian government based on agreement between Lega di Nord (right-wing populism) and 5 Stars (left-wing populism). An analogous convergence was preconfigured in the Yellow Vests populist revolt against Macron in France, in which the followers of Marine Le Pen were fighting the liberal center alongside the followers of Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Thus, in the unipolar world order liberals were somehow obliged to accept the threat of National-Bolshevism – in the broad sense of the term – as something serious. And hence they started to fight against such a convergence by undermining its structures and indices wherever they appeared. But in order to not aid in the promotion of a self-imposed effective alternative to liberal globalist dominance, the global elites undermined the importance of this phenomenon on surface whereas, in reality, they have been fighting against it by all means. If Putin, Xi Jinping, European populists, and Islamic anti-Western movements (similarly neither too ideologically communist nor nationalist), as well as anti-capitalist currents in Latin America and Africa would be conscious that they oppose liberalism from a somehow united ideological position, accepting left/right or integral populism as their explicit ground would have reinforced their resistance considerably, multiplying its potential. So, in order to not let this happen, the liberals have used all means, above all the fifth and sixth columns (liberals well embedded in governmental structures and formally loyal to sovereign leaders in respective regimes) who sought to suppress any ideological move in this direction.
The Enemy Within
But it was precisely their successes in this containment of the potential emergence of a National-Bolshevist – illiberal — ideology in the status of a formal enemy that made liberals more and more alone. They didn’t dare let the formal enemy appear, but the price for that was the gestation of an inner enemy within. This is the crucial point in the birth of liberalism 2.0.
Political ideology cannot exist when the pair of enemy/friend is erased. It loses its identity and cannot continue to be effective. Not having an enemy means ideological suicide. So, an unclear and undefined external enemy wasn’t enough to justify liberalism. With all the demonization of Putin’s Russia and Xi Jinping’s China, liberals could not be fully convincing. More than that: accepting the existence of a formal, structured ideological enemy outside of the zone of liberal influence (democracy, market economy, human rights, universal technology, total networking, and so on) after the onset of the unipolar moment had been presumably global would be equivalent to recognizing some serious failure. So, logically, there had to appear an inner enemy. This was theoretically necessary in the development of ideological processes after the 1990s. And the inner enemy arrived just in time, precisely when it was most needed. It had a name: Donald Trump.
Being labelled from the very moment of his appearance in the 2016 American elections, Donald Trump started to play an extremely important role – that of the enemy.
He incorporated the border line between liberalism 1.0 and liberalism 2.0. He became the midwife of liberalism 2.0, helping it finally be fully born. Initially, there was the weak idea of trying to link Trump with red-brown Putin. Such caused real damage to Trump’s presidency, but, ideologically, it was inconsistent. Not only because of the absence of real relations between Trump and Putin and Trump’s pure ideological opportunism, but also because Putin himself, who looked like a “National-Bolshevist” consciously opposing global liberalism, is in reality much more of a pragmatic realist. Like Trump, he is a ratings populist, and also like Trump, he is more of an opportunist with no interest in ideology.
The alternative scenario of presenting Trump as “fascist” was also ridiculous. As it was overused by his political rivals, it did cause trouble for Trump, but it too was totally inconsistent. Neither Trump himself nor any of his staff were “fascists” or representatives of any far-right tendency long ago totally marginalized in American society and existing only as a kind of libertarian fringe of kitsch culture.
So, dealing with Trump on the ideological level (and not only in propaganda, where all methods are accepted if they work) liberals were obliged to define his position otherwise. And here we approach most important point of our study. Trump was and is a representative of liberalism 1.0. This was discovered to be precisely the main – and this time really inner – enemy of the new liberalism. If we put aside all the foreign regimes that oppose liberal ideology in their political practice as not posing any serious problem, instead being but casual, inarticulate obstacles on the way to the inevitable triumph of liberal progress, there remains only one real enemy of liberalism – liberalism itself. In order to proceed further, liberalism had to make an inner purge.
Here appears an internal, clearly seen and defined split. The new liberalism, grounded on the continuing convergence with left Post-Modernism, ceased to recognize itself in old liberalism. And precisely this old liberalism was identified in the symbolic figure of Donald Trump. And it was judged to be the Other. This explains everything in the ideological deployment of Biden’s campaign – “return to normality’, “build back better” and so on. The “normality” in question is a new normality – the normality of liberalism 2.0. Liberalism 1.0 – national, clearly capitalist, pragmatic, individualist, and in some ways libertarian – was judged henceforth to be “abnormality”. Democracy as the rule of the majority, full freedom of speech and thought, the open possibility to express any position you want, any religious choice, the right to have a family and to organize gender relations on any ground, religious or secular – all of that, fully recognized by liberalism 1.0, became unacceptable. Henceforth: political correctness, cancel culture, the practice of shaming all those who don’t accept this left liberalism as something necessary, justified and normal.
So, liberalism 2.0 has evolved little by little into something totalitarian. It wasn’t such – at least explicitly – when fighting against much more explicitly totalitarian ideologies – communism and fascism. But upon being left alone, liberalism came to manifest its unexpected feature. If liberalism 1.0 wasn’t totalitarian, then liberalism 2.0 is totalitarian. From now on, nobody has the right not to be liberal. The old liberalism would immediately refuse such a thesis, because it is a clear and direct contradiction to the very foundations of liberal ideology based on free choice. The right to be illiberal had been respected just as the right to be liberal. But not now. Not anymore. So, one liberalism has ended – just recently in the moment Trump left the White House. The other liberalism reigns from now on. Here, liberty is no longer free. It is a duty. And the meaning of liberty is not arbitrary. It is clearly defined by the new ruling liberal (2.0) elites. Whoever disagrees is doomed to be canceled.
Friedrich von Hayek: the Beginning
We can trace the ideological evolution of liberalism 2.0 following the at times not too articulate evolution of the ideas of the leading ideologists of 20th-century liberalism themselves. We have here three main stations – Friedrich von Hayek, Karl Popper, and George Soros. They belong to the same tradition – the first was the direct teacher of the second and the second of the third. So it seems they should have more or less the same views. This is partly so but partly not.
Friedrich von Hayek was clearly a pure liberal. In his works he criticized both communism and fascism, emphasizing their commitment to “the project.” In the name of the due, communist and fascist regimes imposed their violent political and economic practices on societies, perverting the natural logic of social and political life. Both overused the future and progress as decisive arguments for the right to rule and to dominate as a political structure endowed with the mission to make this future come about at any price. Thus, communists and fascists violated reality by subjugating it to self-proclaimed “laws of progress”.
Against this, Friedrich von Hayek affirmed the status quo as some point of departure. Theoretically incapable of correctly calculating the future (as there are too many relevant factors – always more than humans mind can take into account) we should try to proceed carefully, mildly, without destroying existing social, political, and economic structures, but sometimes try to simply develop or improve them. Friedrich von Hayek opposed “the project” with the concept of tradition, which in his view was the only basis of organic development, insofar as in tradition he identified the sum of the rational choices of many previous generations, a huge structure of errors and corrections that no project could ever equal.
Being totally opposed to communism and fascism (and, logically, to any mixture of them) Friedrich von Hayek was much closer to Edmund Burke and English conservatism. It is thus not unusual that Friedrich von Hayek’s ideas were accepted by part of the the French Nouvelle Droite (Henry de Lesquen, Yvan Blot, and others) in combination with moderate French nationalism.
Friedrich von Hayek can be considered the ideal example of liberalism 1.0.
Karl Popper: the Middle Point
Friedrich von Hayek’s disciple, Karl Popper – the author of the theory of the “Open Society” and the direct mentor of George Soros – stayed loyal to the Hayek’s ideas on the surface. He accepted the free development of society, severely criticized “the project” as such, and issued generalizations of the common ground of the second and third political theories, thus unintentionally helping the formulation of National-Bolshevist principles. Popper identified the main error of political tradition to be the Platonic acceptance of the existence of ideal State that as the source of norms, and the Aristotelian theory of telos, causa finalis – the end as the main reason justifying the means for reaching it.
Formally following Hayek’s approach, Popper considerably shifted some important emphases. To the title of his main work, The Open Society, he added “and Its Enemies”, thus emphasizing the dualism of his position. Fearing any kind of “liberal project”, Hayek had been very careful in formulating any kind of dualistic approach to politics and ideology. According to Hayek, whether liberal or “project”, liberalism is open organically to everything that exists. It is a kind Stoic ethics.
With Popper, however, we completely change the register. The “Open Society” is an unambiguous liberal project. It divides everybody into two camps –
- the Open Society and
- the enemies of the Open Society.
And there is a war between them. Not only is the tone of Popper’s criticism of Plato or Aristotle, Hegel or Schelling totally intolerant and hysteric, it starkly contrasts Hayek’s calm approach, including to his opponents.
Popper advocated the radical destruction of the Open Society’s enemies, arguing that otherwise, lacking any inner limits, they themselves would destroy the Open Society. Thus, Popper’s logic was: let’s kill them sooner than they kill us.
This already sounds completely different. Here is the shift toward liberalism 2.0. Popper hates everything that can be judged as similar to nationalism or to socialism. He does not only reject the second and third political theories, but criminalizes them and calls for their total annihilation.
In his eyes, there is no choice to be illiberal. Any enemy of the Open Society is by definition an ideological criminal – it is unimportant whether he (or she) is on the right or left side of the political spectrum.
But Karl Popper was still clearly capitalist and economically to the right. Opposed to any kind of communist/socialist elements in art, society, etc., he was also in some ways culturally to the right. So, Popper was not yet a full-scale liberal 2.0, but he is already close.
George Soros: the Destination
Then came the last element of the transition from liberalism 1.0 to liberalism 2.0. Welcome to George Soros’ universe. Ironically, the name “soros” in Hungarian means “next”. What a right choice to be the symbolic figure of liberalism 2.0.
Soros is a pupil of Karl Popper who, as Soros himself recognizes, had a decisive impact on his ideology. Soros became Popper’s devotee and made it his life goal to promote the Open Society everywhere in the world. Here we are dealing with a full-scale liberal project (a contradiction in Hayek’s eyes) that is even more aggressive, radical, and offensive than Popper’s. Popper limited his activism to expressing his views. Soros, becoming one of the richest men in the world through financial speculations, has applied the principles of the Open Society to global politics. Soros chose the name “Open Society” for his foundation, which is an umbrella for a global network of offensive liberalism trying to influence, control, lead, and subvert politics on the world scale. With Soros, liberalism becomes really extremist. He doesn’t hesitate to sponsor color revolutions, uprisings, coups, and so on whenever he considers them to be directed against some enemy of the Open Society. What are the criteria for such? Who is the judge? The criteria are expressed in Soros’ Bible — Popper’s book, The Open Society and Its Enemies. The judge is Soros himself, the main arbiter of the liberal project and its practical implementation.
At the same time, we can take note of some changes in the ideological stance of Soros and his global empire. Soros has begun to more and more approach extreme left liberals, outright Post-Modernists, and full-scale far-left activists. Perhaps because he considers them to be more engaged in political activism – which is necessary to achieve the global goal of the liberal project. Or his views on the capitalist system in general have changed. But his latest writings and, even more so, the political deeds of Soros and the organizations supported by him testify to a growing tendency toward the left – including the far-left that is openly critically toward capitalism as such. Soros actively promotes post-humanism, gender politics, cancel culture, feminism, and all kinds of anti-religious movements. He advocates all of this in the name of progress.
With Soros, thus, we have somehow arrived at the opposite end of liberalism.
If Popper was similar to Hayek and Soros was similar to Popper, then Soros and Hayek appear as two extremes. One (Hayek) is in favor of tradition, radically against any kind of project, and skeptical about progress (as no one can know for sure whether something is progress or not). The other, on the contrary, is in favor of progress and a liberal project that can be called far-left liberalism.
All three of them are against the second and third political theories, but it seems that after victory over them, the serpent turned around to bite its own tail. Soros attacks almost everything that was dear and essential to Hayek.
All of this was clear in Trump’s case. Soros deemed Trump to be his archenemy, which means that none other than Hayek is too. Trump, after all, is not illiberal at all. There is nothing National-Bolshevist in him and his position. He is a pure liberal – of the Hayek sort, not Soros-type.
Here runs the watershed between Hayek (liberalism 1.0) and Soros (liberalism 2.0).
Individual and Dividual
I would like to direct your attention to one more important point: to the problem of the individual as it is “solved” in both ideologies, in liberalism 1.0 and liberalism 2.0.
Classical liberalism put the individual in the center of society. The figure of the individual in the social physics of liberalism plays the same role as the atom in physical science. Society consists of atoms/individuals who represent the only real and empirical foundation of subsequent social, political and economic constructions. Everything can be reduced to the individual. That is the law.
Being so, it is easy to grasp the ethics of liberalism that is the foundation of its understanding of norms and progress. If the individual is the main subject of political theory, he needs to be liberated from all ties with collective entities limiting his freedom and depriving him of his natural rights. Historically, all possible institutions and rules were created by individuals (Thomas Hobbes) but have acquired some undue power over them, the State being a clear example of this (the “Leviathan”). But all social structures – communities, sects, Churches, estates, professions, and in recent time class, nationality and gender, have the same function – they usurp the liberty of individual, imposing on him (or her) the false myths of some “collective identity”. So, the struggle against all kinds of collective identity is the moral duty of liberals, and progress is measured by whether this struggle is succeeding or not.
Such logic is the main road of liberalism. By the end of the 20th century, the main agenda of the liberation of individual had been accomplished. The traditional Pre-Modern European order was defeated and totally destroyed already in early 20th century. The victory over fascism in 1945 and over communism in 1991 marked the two symbolic points of the liberation of individual from national and class (“estatist”) identity (this time as artificial identities invented by Modernist illiberal ideologies). The European Union was created as a monument to this historic victory. Liberalism became its implicit, and sometimes explicit, ideology.
Here the victorious history of liberalism 1.0 stopped. The individual is liberated. The end of history is as near as ever.
There are no more formal enemies outside of liberalism. The ideology of human rights, recognizing almost equal rights for any human being beyond national jurisdictions (such is the main ideological basis of mass migration), is certified.
At this point, liberals realized that, in addition to all their victories, there was still something collective, some forgotten collective identity that should be destroyed as well. Welcome to gender politics. To be a man and woman means to share a definite collective identity prescribing strong social and cultural practices. This is a new challenge for liberalism. The individual should be liberated from sex, as the latter is still regarded as something objective. Gender should be optional and the consequence of purely individual choice.
Gender politics starts here and subtly changes the very nature of the concept of the individual. The Post-Modernists were the first to point out that the liberal individual is a masculine, rationalist construction. In order to “humanize” it (here we still are in the zone of the human), new emancipatory practices should not only overcome the equality of genders, but altogether exchange the good old individual for a new, strange and perverted (as it may seem), construction. The simple equalizing of social possibilities and functions for males and females, including the right to change sexes freely and at will, doesn’t solve the problem. Still the “traditional” patriarchy will prevail in defining rationality, norms, and so on.
So, the Post-Modernists – Deleuze, Guattari and so on – arrived at the conclusion that liberating the individual is not enough. The next step is to liberate the human being, or better, the “living entity” from the individual.
Now comes the moment of the final replacement of the individual with the gender-optional rhizomatic entity, a kind of network-identity. And the last step will be replacing humanity with post-human weird beings – machines, chimeras, robots, Artificial Intelligence, and other species of genetic engineering.
In the 1970s and ‘80s, this was the avant-garde research of extravagant French philosophers. In the ‘90s it became an important trend in the social and cultural domain of Western countries. In Biden’s campaign, it was already a fully-formed ideology on the offensive, glorifying no longer the individual (as in liberalism 1.0), but the new, incoming post-human entity – the techno-centric, gender-optional, post-individual dividual. Left-wing authors such as Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (sponsored and promoted by the same George Soros) prepared the intellectual terrain for these concepts. But now they are accepted by Big Capital itself despite having originally been directed against it.
The line between the individual and the dividual, or between the still human and already post-human, is the main problem of the paradigmatic shift from liberalism 1.0 toward liberalism 2.0.
Trump was a human individualist defending individualism in the still old-style human context. Maybe he was the last. Biden is an advocate of the arrival of post-humanity and dividualism.
Liberalism 2.0 and the Fourth Political Theory
I dedicate the last of my remarks on this truly important topic to the Fourth Political Theory and its development in the present ideological context. The Fourth Political Theory is normatively oriented against all forms of Modernity, against Modernity as such. However, taking into consideration the realities of the First Political Theory’s victory over its rivals, and thereby its securing the status of unique heir to the main spirit of Modernity (the Aufklärung), the Fourth Political Theory is overtly and radically anti-liberal. If we can consider National-Bolshevism as the first stage of ideological political-philosophical reflection on the fact of the final victory of liberalism over communism in 1991 in all its metaphysical depth, then the Fourth Political Theory is clearly the second stage of the same vector. The main difference lies in the Fourth Political Theory’s rejection of Bolshevism, nationalism, or any of mixture of the two as an approximately positive alternative to globally victorious liberalism. That is a consequence of the radically anti-Modern ground of the Fourth Political Theory which should be more than clear in the formulation of its basic principles, none the least in engaging in different compromises with existing political structures, be they right or left. Neither right nor left illiberal populism can achieve sincere victory over liberalism today. In order to do so, we would need to integrate the illiberal left and the illiberal right. But the ruling liberals are very vigilant over this, and they always try to prevent any such move in advance. The short-sightedness of far-left and far-right politicians and groups only carries out the tasks of liberals.
Thus, after 30 years of ideological struggle, I can suggest that we spare the National-Bolshevist stage and pass directly to the Fourth Political Theory itself, rejecting any kind of socialism and nationalism and instead affirming a clearly anti-Modern vision of political organization. It is so difficult enough to unite weak and decadent leftist and rightists, that it would be easier to start from the ground up and construct the Fourth Political Theory as a fully independent and openly anti-Modern ideology. But, at the same time, we should not ignore the evident and growing abyss between liberalism 1.0 and liberalism 2.0 It seems that the inner purge of Modernity and Post-Modernity is now leading to the brutal punishment and full excommunication of a new species of political beings – this time the victims will be liberals themselves, those who do not recognize themselves in the Biden-Soros Great Reset strategy, those who refuse to enjoy the final disappearance of good old humanity, good old individuals, good old freedom or the market economy. There will be no place for any of that in liberalism 2.0. It is going post-human, and anyone who questions this will be welcomed into the club of the enemies of the Open Society. We have been here for decades and we feel more or less comfortable here. So, welcome to hell, newcomers. Any Trump supporter or ordinary Republican is now considered a potentially dangerous personality, exactly as we have been for a long time.
Here is the important point. When we insist on overcoming the National-Bolshevist stand, we do not mean to be more acceptable for liberals. No, we simply clarify our position in order to make it more consistent with deep anti-Modern principles. However, in the present transition from liberalism 1.0 to liberalism 2.0, this might incidentally have some practical connotations.
Liberals 1.0 should take note of the fact that the Fourth Political Theory identifies as its main ideological enemy that reality which is today the manifestation of what they hate and by which they are suffering. Trumpism and generally human individualistic liberalism are now under attack. In the eyes of Sorosites and Bidenites, they are almost identical to National-Bolshevists and so on. They make no distinction. To be an enemy of the Open Society is the final sentence. You cannot change this. So, it is high time to take note of the fact that liberals 1.0 are no longer respectable citizens of the capitalist status quo. Liberals 1.0 are now being sent into exile, into the political ghetto – to us. Because the Fourth Political Theory calls for revising the whole course of political Modernity, it is not necessary to become friendly to communism or nationalism in this ghetto. This is not about National-Bolshevism.
The Fourth Political Theory is about the final battle for humanity against liberalism 2.0 – exactly what you think of. From the very beginning it was a kind of compromise to include “nationalism” in the revolt against the modern world. Evola well explained the reasons and limits of that. It was no lesser – and maybe far greater – of a compromise to include the anti-liberal left, i.e., socialists and communists, if they were sincerely counter-hegemonically oriented. We can now take one step more: let liberals 1.0 join ranks. To do this it is not necessary to become illiberal, philo-communist, or fiercely nationalist. Nothing of the sort. Everybody can keep their good old prejudices as long as they wish. The Fourth Political Theory is a unique position where true liberty is welcome. The liberty to fight for social justice, the liberty to be a patriot, and the liberty to defend the State, the Church, the people, family, and the liberty to stay human and the liberty to become something else. Liberty is not on their side anymore. Liberalism 2.0 is the enemy of any liberty. So, let us not lose this value. It is a most great value, because it is the essence of the human soul and human heart. Liberty opens us up to the way to God, to sacrality, and to love.
If liberty must become political, let it be our main slogan.